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This paper suggests a new 'value' for cooperative games with
transferable utilities. The main feature of this value is that it rests on the
(both internal and external) stability of the payoifs which members of a
deviating coalition can expect to obtain. Loosely speaking, let S be a
coalitionl. An S-Pareto optim al payoff, x, belongs to the set of "reasonable
payoffs for S" if and only if there exists no subset T such that the
evaluation2 of the set of 'reasonable payoffs for T', yields each of its
members a higher payoff than what he gets under x. The stable value (w.r.t.
the given evaluation function) is defined to be the evaluation of the set of
'reasonable payoffs for the grand coalition, N'.
The reader who is familiar with the theory of social situations
(Greenberg 1990), will immediately recognize that the logic behind this
value is the one which underlies the whole theory. Indeed, if inembers of a
(deviating) coalition T were to consider the best payoff within the set of
'reasonable payoffs for T", rather than the evaluation of this set, then the
resulting unique "optimistic stable standard of behavior' yields the core
correspondence. (See Greenberg 1990, Theore m 6.1.3.) If, in addition, every
1 A coalition is a nonempty subset of the set of players.
2 The w ay in w hich the evaluation is done is quite general; see Definition
2.3. For concreteness, assume that a set of payoffs is evaluated according to
the expected (w.r.t. some measure) payoff; see Section 4.
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coalition - not necessarily subsets - could object to a proposed payoff, then
there is a 1-1 correspondence between an optimistic stable standard of
behavior (for this 'situation') and a von Neumann and Morgenstern solution
to the game. (See Greenberg 1990, Theorem 6.2.3.)
We shall, however, be able to define the stable value without
(explicitly) using the apparatus and terminology of the theory of social
situations.
The paper is organized as follo ws. The next section provides the
form al definition of stability. Perhaps the most important task of the social
scientist is to recommend a course of action that will be accepted to the
players. In our case, this means recommending a payoff in the set of
'reasonable payoffs for the grand coalition'. In section 3 w e investigate the
nonemptiness of this set. Only partial answers are provided: The set of
'reasonable payoffs for the grand coalition' is nonempty in every game with
a nonempty core, as well as in all two and three-player superadditive
games. Whether such is the case with all superadditive games remains an
interesting open question (even w hen cast within 'classical cooperative
ga me theory'). Section 4 studies a particularly appealing evaluation
function, Dased on the uniform distribution. We provide a full
characterization of the stable value for two and three-person games as w ell
as for all symmetric games. The last section contains a few examples which
shed more light on the stable value, and distinguish it irom the Shapley
value (Shapley 1953). In order not to interrupt the conceptual flow oi the
paper, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2. Stability
Definition 2.1: An n-person game in characteristic function form with
transferable utilities, hereafter a ame, is a pair (N,y) where N:{1,2,...,nf
is the finite set of players, and }~ is the characteristic function which
assigns to each coalition S, SCN, its 'worth' - a nonnegative number
y(S)eR..
One common interpretation ot the worth of coalition S is that y~(S)
denotes the monetary profits S can generate if and when it forms, and all
players have the same, constant, marginal utility of money. For a coalition
SCN, the sets of S-feasible and of S-Pareto optimal payoffs are given,
respectively, by
v(S)~{xeRS.~ FicSxlc y(S)1 and v'(S).{zcRS.~ EicSxt-N(S)).
A central question is: Given a game (N,y), which payoffs will be
accepted by ('rational') players? The answer to this question depends on
what the players think (know, believe, anticipate) will happen ii a payoff is
rejected. That is, for each coalition S, SCN, there is associated a subset,
ss(S), of v'(S), which specifies 'the set of reasonable payoffs 1or S, if and
when it forms.' It is only on the basis of a(S) that members of S can
decide whether or not to reject a proposed payoff. A mapping that assigns
to each coalition S, SCN, a subset, s1(S), of v'(S), is called a standa~d ol
behayíor (S8). In order for the SB Q to De adopted by 'rational" players,
we shall require that it be 'stable': For all SCN, a(S) consists of all those,
and only those payoffs that will not De rejected by members of S, who are
aware of, and believe in the specifications of the SB a. More specifically,
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given the SB Q, an S-Pareto optimal payoff x will not be accepted by S if
and only if there exists a subset T all of whose members prefer 6(T) over x.
The difficulty in formalizing this idea stems from the fact that we
need to compare a single payoff, x, with a set of payoffs, Gi(T). There is no
general rule according to which such a comparison can be made. We shall,
therefore, allow for any general evaluation of this set, provided that it is
common to all members of T. More specifically, let UCV"(T). The
eyaluation of U is a payoff in v'(T). (For example, it can be the
expectations of U w.r.t. some probability measure; see Section 4.) 5ince no
constraints are imposed on the set U, we cannot require that every set U be
evatuated. (For example, U may be empty, open, non-measurable, etc.) In
general, therefore, we may want to restrict our attention to a subset of
F.{(S,U) I SCN and UCv'(S)F.
Definition 2.2: Let DCF. A function ~, which assigns to every (S.U)eD a
payoff, ~(U)cv'(S), is calted an evaluation function (over the domain
D).
Given an evaluation function, ~, (over some domain DCF), we can now
formalize the notion oi 'stable recommendations': The SB Q is stable if the
set o1 payoffs, 6(S), which are recommended to members of S contains all
those, and only those payoffs that will not be rejected Dy S, where
rejection is based on ~ and 6. That is, an S-Pareto optimal payotf x will be
rejected by S if and only if there exists T, TCS, all of whose members
prefer the set 6(T) (evaluated by cJ1) over the payoff x. Formally,
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Definition 2.3: Let ( N,y~) be a game and let ~p be an evaluation function
over DCF. The SB a is called stable w.r.t. dt if it satisfies: For all
SCN, and for all xev'(S),
xev'(S)`a(S) e~ there exists TCS s.t. (T,a(T))eD and xl~rDi(6(T)) for all icT.
That is, if a is a stable SB then the following two conditions hold:
(1) Internal stability: The SB a is free of 'inner contradictions': If
xe6(S) then there is no subset T all of whose members are better-off
(according to ~ and a] if T forms than they currently are. That is, if xea(S)
then there exists no TCS s.t. (T,a(T))eD and x~~~i(a(T)) for all ieT. It
follows that il players believe in a, and if they evaluate a set oT payoffs
according to the function ~, then no payoff that belongs to a(S) will be
rejected by any subset of S. Thus, the SB e1 is (internally) consistent.
2. External stability: The SB a accounts for all those payoffs that it
rules out: Every S-Pareto optimal payoff that is excluded from 6(S) would
be rejected by some coalition TCS whose members expect to be better-off
by forming T, believing that the set of payoffs that might obtain once T
forms is a(T). That is, if xev'(S)`a(S) then there exists TCS s.t. (T,Q(T))eD
and xi~~~(a(T)) for all ieT. Thus, the SB a cannot arbitrarily label a payoff
as 'unreasonable'.
The following two claims assert that the two requirements of
internal and external stability are satisfied by exactly one SB. Moreover,
'the set of reasonable outcomes' for any SCN, according to this unique
stable SB, has the following appealing topological property: It is either
empty or else it is a finite union of compact and convex sets.
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Claim 2.4: Let (N,y~) be a game and let c~ be an evaluation function over
the domain DCF. Then, there exists a unique SB a which is stable w.r.t. c~.
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 2.5: Let (N,y) be a game, let ~ be an evaluation function over the
domain DCF, and let a be the stable SB for (N,N). Then, for all SCN, a(S) is
either empty or else it is a finite union of compact and convex sets.
Proof: See Appendix.
Since the evaluation of (S,U)eD equals to ~(U)ev'(S), it seems natural
to define player i's evaluation of the game (N,y) to be equal to his
evaluation (w.r.t. cp) of the set of 'reasonable payoffs for the grand
coalition', provided this evaluation is well-defined, i.e., that (N,a(N))eD.
We therefore have the tollowing
Definition 2.8: Let ( N,y) be a game, and let ~ be an evaluation function
over the domain D such that ( N,a(N))eD, where a is the stable SB w.r.t. tD.
The stable value ( w.r.t. ~) of (N,y) is rD(6(N)).
Note that the stable value (w.r.t. ~) need not itself belong to the set
of 'reasonable payoffs for the grand coalition'. That is, it is possible that
~(6(N))ea(N).1 (See Examples 5.1 and 5.2).
1 Just as the expectations from throwing a die is 3.5 - a number that
appears on no face of the die.
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3. An Open Ouestion
As mentioned in the Introduction, perhaps the most important task of
the social scientist is ta recommend a course of action that will be
accepted to the players. In our case, this means recommending a payoff in
the set of 'reasonable payoffs for the grand coalition', a(N). This section
investigates the nonemptiness of this set. Recall
Definition 3.1: Let (N,y) be a game. The core of the game (N,}~), denoted
Core(N,y~), is given by
Core(N,}~)~{xEV'(N) I for all SCN, E iEg xi ?~(S)f .
Claim 3.2: Let (N,y~) be a game, let cp be an evaluation lunction over
DCF. Then, Core(N,y)C6(N), where Q is the unique stable SB (w.r.t. c~). In
particular, if Core(N,y):,a then 6(N):ra.
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 3.2 implies that for 'batanced games' (see Bondareva 1962, and
Shapley 1967), the stable SB (w.r.t. any cp), a, contains 'reasonable
outcomes', i.e., o(N):~. However, such is clearly not the case with all
games. For example, consider a two-person game where }~(1).u(2)~y(N). Then,
for all xev"(N) there exists iEN such that x~~y(í). ft follows that a(N)-r~
for all evaluation functions cQ which satisfy the very mild and natural
condition: ~(v"(i))-}~(i), iEN. This observation raises the question whether
superadditivity is a sufficient condition for a(N) to be nonempty in an
arbitrary n-person game,t where,
1 For n~3, superadditivity is not a necessary condition for o(N) to be
nonempty.
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Definition 3.~: The game ( N,y) is called suDeradditive if for all
S,TCN with SnT-~, we have that }~(S).N(T)5y(SuT).
Whether or not the domain of games which admit 'reasonable
outcomes' includes all superadditive games remains an ooen auestion.
While the motivation stems from our stability criterion, this open question
can be posed within the 'classical paradigm" of game theory:
0: Let (N,~) be s superadditive game. For each SCN, S:N, let
~(S)ev(S). Does there exist a payoff yev(N), [hence in v'(N)].
such that there is no S with ~i(S)~y~for all ieS ~
To realize that a game (N,}~) admits "reasonable outcomes' (for every
evaluation function ~) if and only if 0 is satisfied, (i.e., answered in the
affirmative), define:
C(S).cp(a(S)) it (S,a(S))eD, and ~(S)~0 otherwise.
Remark 3.5: When investigating 0, we can, w.l.o.g., consider only 0-
normalized superadditive games, i.e., games (N,u) where y(i)-0 for all
ieN. Indeed, consider any superadditive game. (N,y). Detine the 0-normalized
game (N,u) as follows: For all SCN, u(S).y~(S)-EieSU(~). Then, it is
easily verified that (N,u) is superadditive, and moreover, (N,u) satisfies 0
if and only if (N,u) satisfies it.
9
By Ctaim 3.2, the open question 0 is answered in the affirmative
whenever (N,y~) admits a nonempty core. The following two claims assert
that 0 is satisfied also in every tw o and three-person superadditive game.
Claim 3.6: Every two-person superadditive game satisfies o.
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 3.7: Every three-person superadditive game satisfies 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
4. Uniform distriDution
A particularly appealing evaluation function is derived from the
often employed assumption of 'insufficient reason': In the absence of an
exogenously given probability distribution over a set of payoffs, U, players
assume that all such payoffs are egually likely. Thus, a player's evaluation
of a set of payoffs U equals his expected payoff from this set, w hen the
expectations are taken using the (multidimensional Lebesgue measure)
uniform distribution over U, (assuming this distribution can be defined over
U). It seems to me that, at least within the framework of games with
transferable utilities, such an evaluation is quite reasonable. Define,
therefore,
D'~{(S,U) I SCN, and UCV'(S) s.t. the uniform distribution
can be defined over Uf.
For (S,U)e0', let E(U) denote the S-dimensional payoff vector which equals
the expectations of U, using the uniform distribution. The SB 6 is called
stable if it is stable w.r.t. the evatuation function E(defined over the
domain D").
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By Claim 2.4, there exists a unique stable SB, a. For a game (N,y)
such that (N,a(N))eD", the stable yalue is defined to be E(a(N)). The
following claim shows that the stable value is well-defined whenever
a(N): ~. (re-enforcing the interest in the open question 0).
Claim 4.1: Let a be the stable SB for the game (N,}~). Then, for all SCN,
a(S):~ implies (S.a(S))eD", i.e.. E(a(S)) is well-defined.
Proof: See Appendix.
By Claim 4.1, we have that a SB a is stable if for all SCN,
xev"(S)`a(S) a there exists TCS s.t. a(T))x~
and z~~E~(a(T)) for all icT.
It is straightforw ard to verify that the stable value shares the
following three properties:
Pareto optimality: The stable value distributes the entire worth of a
coalition. (Thus. E is an evaluation function.) Formally, for al! SCN with
a(S):re, sieSE'(a(S))-u(S).
Symmetry: Symmetric ( substitute) players are assigned the same expected
payoff. Formally, let SCN and i,jeS be such that for all TCS, if {i,j}nT-ra
then y(Tu{il)-y~(Tu{j}). Then, xea(S) if and onty if yea(S) where yl~xl,
yJ?x~, and for teS`{i,j}, yt,xt. If, in additíon, a(S):ra then Ei(a(S))-E1(a(S)).
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Strategic equivalence: The stable value is invariant under positive
linear transformations of the game. Formally, Let (N,y) and (N,c.i) be two
games such that there exists a positive number a, and a vector beRN such
that for all SCN, ~(S)-ay~(S).EiEgb~. Then, xeal~(S) if and only ii
(ax.bS)eo~(S), where Cu and a~ are the unique stable SBs for,
respectively, (N,N) and (N,~). In particutar, if al~(S):ra (hence, a~(S)xg) then
E~(a~(S))-aE~(al~(S)).b~, ieS.
The symmetry property together with Claim 3.6 yield
Corollary 4.2: Let (N,y~) be a two-person superadditive game. Then, the
unique stable SB is nonempty-valued, and is given by: For ieN,
6(i)-v"(i)-{y(i)E, and a(N)-Core(N,}~). In particular, the stable value, E(a(N)),
for this game is given by: E~(Q(N))-y~(1).b12, E2(a(N))-};(2).S12, where S is
the surplus from forming N, í.e., S-(y(N)-y(1)-y(2)).
That is, the two players split evenly the surplus S, which, in view of
the superadditivity of the game is nonnegative. By Claim 3.7, the stable SB
for a three-person superadditive game is nonempty-valued. The followíng
explicit formula for the stable value of such games was derived by Dave
Furth and Pieter Kop Jansen.~ In view of the fact that a is invariant under
positive linear transformations, it is sufficient to consider 0-1 normalized
games. That is, the characteristic lunction y satisfies:
y~(i)-0 for all ieN ; }~(2,3)-a ; ~(1,3)-~ ;
}~(1,2)-á ; ~(N)-1, where, w.l.o.g., 1?oe~??l?0.
l Pieter Kop Jansen provided also a computer program that calculates the
stable value for all three person games.
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Denote the two scalars:
a-Max{0, alz.~-1i ; b~Max{0, aly.7l-11,
and the f ive vectors in R3:
~~(1-alz, al~, al~) ; ~z(~1~, 1-~Iz, al~) ;




The stable value for the game (N,N) is given by: For 6-0
E(Q(N))-(~I~.~I~.~l~).
and for 8:0,
E(a(N))-[(~ I3,~ Ia.~ Ia) -~ ~za~C -~ ~s9~~1- ~ ~:~~~ ~~ ~apa~ ~~ ~a zb2)le.
As the following claim asserts, n-person superadditive and symmetric
games provide another class of ga mes for w hich the stable value is well-
defined. ( Recal! that (N,y) is a symmetric game if }~(S)-N(T) whenever~
ISI-IT~).
Claim 4.3: If (N,}~) is a superadditive and symmetric game then the stable
SB a is nonempty-valued. Moreover, the stable value is given by:
E(6(N))-(y(N)In,y(N)In,...,y~(N)In).
Proof: See Appendix.




The following examples shed some more light on the proposed stable
value.
ExamDle 5.1: Consider the well-known three-person majority rule game
(N,y), where every two or three players can share a dollar. That is.
N-{1,p,3E ; for icN: y(i)-0 ; and for SCN. ~ S I~1: y(S)-1.
By Corollary 4.2, we have that E(r1(i,j))-(112,112). It follows that
o(N)-{(1 I2,1 I2,0),(1I2,0,1 l2),(0,112.1 I2)i.
That is, the only payoffs the players can reasonably expect to get (i.e., those
payoffs that will not be rejected by any coalition) are those obtained by
two of the players dividing the dollar equally among themselves. These
recommendations seem, at least to me, to be very appealing.~ Note that, as
asserted in Claim 3.7, the stable value of this game is
E(a(N))-(113,113,113), and it is not, ítself, a member of 6(N).
!t is both appropriate and instructive to compare the stable value
with the well-known Shapley value (Shapley 1953). The following example
demonstrates that these are two distinct concepts. in particular, the stable
value does not satisfy the 'dummy axiom". Moreover, and again unlike the
Shapley value, the stable value need not belong to the core of a"convex
game' (Shapley 1971). (Recall that (N,y) is convex if for all S,TCN, we
have that }~(S).y~(T)sN(SuT).}~(SnT).)
1 In contrast, as is well-known, the core of this game is empty, and there
are a continuum of vNBM solutions. There is, however, a unique symmetric
vNBM solution; it coincides with a(N).
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ExamDle 5.2: Consider the convex game (N,y~) where
N-{1,2,31; y(N)-~(1,2)-1 ; and y(S)-0, otherwise.
By Corollary 4.2, E(a(1,2))-(112,112). Thus,
6(N)-{xcv"(N)I xtzll2}u{x) x~?ll2}.
Hence, the stable value is E(a(N))-(5I12,5I12.1I6). (See Figure 5.2.) In
contrast, the Shapley value for this game is the payoff (1I2,II2,0). Being a
convex game, the Shapley value belongs to Core(N,};)-{xev'(N)I x~.xz-1 and
xy-01, while E(a(N)) does not.
Note that player 3 is a'dummy player' - his marginal contribution is
0 in all coalitions to which he belongs. Nevertheless, the stable value
assigns player 3 the (expected) payoff of tI6. This might perhaps seem
implausible. I would like to argue otherwise. Assume that the players
consider to divide the dollar among themselves according the the payoff
vector y-(0.9,0,0.1). The conventional argument against this payoff is that
player 2 can suggest to player 1 to form the coalition {1,2i, and to equally
divide betw een them the 0.1 dollars that player 3 currently gets. ~ player
2 can commit himselt to this division once '3 leaves the scene', then it
does indeed seem most reasonable that y cannot be the final payoff. (lndeed,
y is not in the core of the game.) But in the absence of such a commitment,
I very much doubt that player 1 will be willing to form coalition {1,2~ and
risk the distinct possibility that player 2, after player 3's departure, wíll
renege. In fact, player 2 might even demand 0.9 dollars and player 1 might
have no choice but to accept this ofier, because his alternative, once 3 is
gone, is to get 0. All player 1 can expect to get once he remains only with
player 2, is 0.5 dollars, as asserted in Corollary 4.2. Thus, player 3 might









accounts for his expected payoff of 116, despite the fact that he is a dummy
player.
The last example, due to Dave Furth and Roald Ramer, generalizes the
above two, and, more importantly, demonstrates that the stable value might
exhibit 'discontinuities'.
Examole 5.3: Consider the game (N,ya) where a, Oso~1, is a parameter
that satisfies
N-{1,2,3j ; ~a(i)-0 tor all ieN ;
Na(1,2)-1 ; ya(2,3)-ya(1,3):a ; ya(N)-1.
Thus, when o~-1 we get Exampte 5.1, and a-0 yields Example 5.2. let
aa be the unique stable SB for (N,}~a). It can be shown (see formula for the
stable value of a three-person game given in the previous section) that ior
ll2~ot~1,
E(aa(N))-((4-a)I9, (4-a)IB, al4).
Hence, lima-i1E(6a(N))-(3I9,3IB,114). But, as verified in Example 5.1, for
or-1 we have that
E(6~(N)):(ll3,ll3,ll3):(3I6,3I6,114).
A possible explanation for this discontinuity (in a) is that there is a
qualitative difference between being "exactly as powerful as' to being
'nearly as powerful as'. And, it is this difference that accounts for the fact
that in any game (N,~a) with a~1, the stable value assigns players 1 and 2,
a payoff w hich exceeds that which it assigns to player 3.
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Appendlx
Claim 2.4: Let (N,y) be a game and let tD be an evaluation function over
the domain DCF. Then, there exists a unique SB a which is stable w.r.t. tD.
Proof: By induction on the cardinality of N. For n-1, i.e.. N-(if,
a(N)-v'(N)-(y~(i)), and thus the assertion holds.
Assume the validity of the claim for all games with less than n
players, and let N consist of n players. Then, by the induction hypothesis.
for all SCN, S:N, there exists a uníque stable SB, ag, for the ( sub)game
(S,yS), where for all TCS, yg(T)ay(T). Define the SB a as follows:
o(S).ag(S), if SCN, SsN,
a(N) . {xev'(N)I there is no SCN, S:N, s.t. (S,o(S))eD and
~t(og(S))~x( for all icSf.
It is easy to verify that o is stable for (N,y). Moreover, the induction
hypothesis implies that for all SCN, S:N, ag(S) is unique. Since a(N) is
defined solely on the basis of ag(S), S:N, it follows that a is the unique
stable SB for (N,y).
O.E.D.
Claim 2.5: Let (N,}~) be a game, let ~ be an evaluation function over the
domain DCF, and let a be the stable SB for (N,}~). Then, for all SCN, Q(S) is
either e m pty or else it is a finite union of compact and convex sets.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the number of players in the coalition
S. For I S I-1 , a(S)-v"(S). Assume the validity of the claim for all
coalitions with less than p players, and let S consist of p players. Denote:
6s{TCS I T:S, a(T):ra, and (T,a(T))eDF.
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Consider Te0. By the induction hypothesis, a(T) is a finite union of compact
and convex sets. For ieT denote the set
Ai(T).(xcv`(S) I ~i(a(T))sxi}.
Then, Ai(T) is a closed, hence compact, and convex subset of v'(S). Thus,
the set A(T).uitTAl(T) is a finite union of compact and convex subsets
oi v"(S). Now, a(S)-~TEOA(T). Hence, a(S) is either empty or etse it is a
finite union of compact and convex sets ( of the iorm ~kA~(k)(Tk) where
Tke9, i(k)eTk).
O.E.D.
Claim 3.2: Let (N,~) be a ga me and let c)1 be an evaluation function over
DCF. Then, Core(N,y~)Ca(N), where a is the unique stable SB (w.r.t. rD). ln
particular, if Core(N,N):~ then a(N):ra.
Proof: Let xeCore(N,~). Then, there are no SCN and yev"(S) such that yi~x~
for all ieS. It follows that there is no SCN such that :Qi(a(S))~xi for all
ieS. Hence, xea(N).
O.E.D.
Claim 3.8: Every two-person superadditive game satisfies Q.
Proof: Such games have a nonempty core. The validity of the claim
follows, therefore, from Claim 3.2.
O.E.D.
Claim 3.7: Every three-person superadditive game satisfies 0.
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Proof: By remark 3.5, assume, w.l.o.g., that ( N,y~) is 0-normalized. Then,
we have to consider only the 3 two-player coalitions. W.l.o.g., let player 1
and coalition T-{1,2F be such that
t;~(T)z~~(S) for all i and all SCN, I S ~-2.
Define the payoff y as follows: y~:0, y2:~~(T), and ya~e;~(T). By
superadditivity, y(1,2)s~(N), hence, yev(N). Now, every coalition SCN, I S I-2,
S:T, contains player 3. By the choice of player 1 and the coatition T,
y3z~~(S) for all such S, and hence, no coalition taht contains player 3 can
block y. And, since y2-~~(T), T can not block y, either.
O.E.D.
Claim ~1.1: Let a be the stable SB for the game (N,u). Then, for all SCN,
o(S):~ implies ( S,a(S))eD", i.e., E(o(S)) is well-defined.
Proof: By Claim 2.5, a(S) is either empty or else it is a finite union of
co m pact and convex sets, for all SCN. Since the relative interior of a
convex set is nonempty, it follows that a compact and convex set has a
positive finite Lebesgue measure in the appropriate dimension (i.e., that of
the smallest linear manifold containing it), and in higher dimensions, its
Lebesgue measure is 0. Therefore, the uniform distribution can be defined
over a finíte union of co m pact and convex sets. Thus, E(Q(S)) is w ell-
defined for all SCN for which a(S):ra.
O.E.D.
Corollart,~ 4.2: Let (N,y) be a two-person superadditive game. Then, the
unique stable SB is nonempty-valued, and is given by: For ieN,
a(i)-v"(i):{y(i)f, and 6(N)-Core(N,y). In particular, the stable value, E(6(N)),
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for this game is given by: E~(a(N))-y(1).b12, EZ(a(N))-y~(2).b12, where b is
the surplus from forming N, i.e., b-(}~(N)-}~(1)-y(2)).
Proof: 8y Claim 3.2, o(N)DCore(N,y~). Now, since n-2, only single players
can block a Pareto optimal payoff. That is, we have that xev'(N)`Core(N,y)
e~ there exists ieN such that xi~~(i).
O.E.D.
Claim 4.3: If (N,}~) is a symmetric and superadditive game, then the
stable SB a is nonempty-valued. Moreover, the stabte value is given by:
E(6(N))-(u(N)In,y(N)In....,y(N)In).
Proof: In view of the symmetry of the game, for all SCN, O(S) is
symmetric, that is, xea(S) if and only if every permutation of x belongs to
Q. Thus, it 6(S):ra, then E(a(S))-(y(S)I I S I,N(S)I I S I,...,N(S)I I S I). It is,
therefore, left to show that Q(N):ra. The proof is by induction on N(in fact,
it is a constructive proof). For n-1 the validity of the claim is evident.
Assume its validity for all games with less than n players, n?2, and let
(N,}~) be an n-person game. Denote by m the size of a coalition whose per-
capita payoff is maximal, that is, }~(S)I I S I is maximized for I S I-m. By the
induction hypothesis, for all SCN, S:N, 6(S):~. Hence, Ei(d(S))-y(S)I I S I for
all icS. Now if m-n then (y(N)In,}~(N)In,...,y(N)In)ea(N). Otherwise, consider
the (sub)game (N,y) where N-{m.l,...,nE, and y is the restriction of }~ to
subsets of N. Let á be the stable SB for ( N,y). By the induction hypothesis,
~(N):ra. Let xe~(N), and define xeRn~ as follows: x~-~(M)Im if
ieM-{1,2....,m1, and xi-x~ if i~M. By superadditivity, NnM-r~ implies that
20
SiEN x~s y~(N). Thus, there exists yev"(N) with yi?x~ for all ieN. By the
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